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Abstract
Elay Shech and John Earman have recently argued that the common
topological interpretation of the Aharonov–Bohm (AB) effect is unsat-
isfactory because it fails to justify idealizations that it presupposes. In
particular, they argue that an adequate account of the AB effect must
address the role of boundary conditions in certain ideal cases of the effect.
In this paper I defend the topological interpretation against their criticisms.
I consider three types of idealization that might arise in treatments of
the effect. First, Shech takes the AB effect to involve an idealization in
the form of a singular limit, analogous to the thermodynamic limit in
statistical mechanics. But, I argue, the AB effect itself features no singular
limits, so it doesn’t involve idealizations in this sense. Second, I argue
that Shech and Earman’s emphasis on the role of boundary conditions in
the AB effect is misplaced. The idealizations that are useful in connecting
the theoretical description of the AB effect to experiment do interact
with facts about boundary conditions, but none of these idealizations
are presupposed by the topological interpretation of the effect. Indeed,
the boundary conditions for which Shech and demands justification are
incompatible with some instances of the AB effect, so the topological
interpretation ought not justify them. Finally, I address the role of the
non-relativistic approximation usually presumed in discussions of the AB
effect. This approximation is essential if—as the topological interpretation
supposes—the AB effect constrains and justifies a relativistic theory of the
electromagnetic interaction. In this case the ends justify the means. So
the topological view presupposes no unjustified idealizations.
1 Introduction
In a number of recent papers, Elay Shech (2015, 2018a,b, 2019) and John Earman
(2019) have argued for a re-evaluation of the Aharonov–Bohm (AB) effect, a
phenomenon in the quantum theory of electromagnetically charged particles.
They argue that more careful consideration of the effect can teach us lessons
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about foundational issues in physics and about modelling and idealization in
science more generally. On their view, important facts about functional analysis
are too often “swept under the carpet as a ‘merely technical’ issue” (Shech,
2018a, 4841); in particular, they claim, physicists and philosophers have not
sufficiently attended to the domains of definition of relevant operators. These
conclusions about foundations of physics lead to conclusions about modelling
and idealization. In this paper I dispute their foundational points and argue
that the topological interpretation of the AB effect does not involve unjustified
or unusual idealizations.
Shech and Earman both level complaints against the “topological view” of
the AB effect; this view is Shech’s explicit target, while Earman criticizes a
general class of analyses to which the topological view belongs. The AB effect
can be seen when operating a beam of electrons in the neighborhood of a magnet.
Even if you perfectly shield the magnet—so that the electric and magnetic fields
near the beam both vanish—the behavior of your electron beam will covary with
the magnetic field inside the magnet. This is striking: facts inside the magnet
seem to be making a difference to the electron beam at a distance, unmediated
by the intervening magnetic field. Topological explanations of this effect appeal
to the fact that the region outside the magnet has a “hole” in it where the
magnet should be, and argue that in the presence of such a hole, the electric
and magnetic fields to not capture all the electromagnetic facts.1 Shech isn’t
convinced. He argues that this picture of a “hole” in space is an idealization and
that if we relax the idealization then the topological explanation no longer works.
On Shech’s view, understanding the AB effect means attending to the details of
this idealization—especially to the electron beam’s interaction with the magnet’s
shielding. In this he agrees with Earman, who complains that the philosophical
literature has neglected the role of unitarily inequivalent representations of the
canonical commutation relations in modelling the idealized shielding.
I think a version of the topological view is correct and that Shech and
Earman are barking up the wrong tree; details about the shielding belong
under the proverbial rug. It’s true that no realistic shielding is perfect, and it’s
true that a careful mathematical analysis of an electron’s interaction with an
ideal shield means digging into delicacies of functional analysis. But neither
of these things is relevant to modelling the AB effect on the topological view.
Indeed, on the topological view the AB effect occurs whether or not there is any
shielding. The perfect shield in the last paragraph was mostly for drama, much
like the moon’s negligible atmosphere can be used for a striking demonstration
of Galileo’s law of free fall. In §2 I argue that the topological view’s reference
to a hole in space doesn’t involve any idealization—some things, like donuts,
just have holes. To illustrate this, I describe the topological view in some detail,
reconstructing Aharonov and Bohm’s (1959) original description of the effect
as a proposal for a crucial experiment to resolve an ambiguity in the quantum
theory of charged particles: are all of the electromagnetic facts captured by the
1Elements of the topological view are expressed by Aharonov and Bohm (1959), Batterman
(2003), Lyre (2004), Nounou (2003), and Wu and Yang (1975).
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electric and magnetic fields, or is there something more? More precisely: do
two electromagnetic potentials represent the same physical state of affairs when
they are gauge equivalent or when they have the same field strength? In this
experimental context, topological features of the apparatus are essential for this
“something more” to have an experimental signature, but these features aren’t
idealizations.
Now we’ve read our Duhem, so we know that there are no crucial experiments;
Aharonov and Bohm’s experiment relies on auxiliary assumptions, and alternative
theories of the experiment are always logically possible. In §3 I consider whether
the idealizations about the shielding that concern Shech and Earman can be
found in these auxiliary assumptions or alternative theories. On one reading,
Shech criticizes the topological view for failing to justify the assumption that
imperfections in the magnet’s shielding will have a negligible effect. On this
reading his comments are complementary to the topological view: the latter isn’t
in the business of justifying this assumption about shielding, and the functional
analysis facts he cites provide the topological view with a response to the skeptic
who questions this assumption. On another reading, Shech may be proposing an
alternative explanation of the behavior of charged particles near a magnet. This
alternative explanation would be of the kind that Earman promotes—though, as
Earman argues, justifying these assumptions about the shielding is only part of a
complete explanation of the AB effect. On this reading we face a straightforward
case of contrastive underdetermination. Idealizations arise on both readings, but
they are the garden variety that arise whenever theory meets experiment.
In the final section I address the idealization of the electron as a non-
relativistic particle. Earman complains that most discussions of the AB effect
are set in “the bastardized theory in which a quantized electron is subjected
an external classical electromagnetic field” (2019, 2013). He claims that this
theory is inappropriate for foundational study twice over: the electromagnetic
field is really quantum, and the electron is really an excitation in a field. From
the point of view of quantum field theory these are idealizations, and discussions
of the AB effect do make them. They are also essential for the AB effect to
play the role the topological view grants it. As I argue in §4, the topological
view conceives of the AB effect as a signpost on the way to a quantum theory of
the electromagnetic field: in the non-relativistic and large-mass limit, any such
theory must reproduce the AB effect. In this case idealization is essential to the
project of constraining the low-energy limit of quantum field theory, but it is
only an idealization from the point of view of the more fundamental theory.
2 Essential idealizations
Shech charges the topological view with baldfaced absurdity: on his reconstruc-
tion, the view says that a single spacetime region both has a hole and does
not have a hole. As I argue in this section, this isn’t a plausible reconstruction
of the topological view. In addition to its absurdity, Shech’s reconstruction
neglects the aim of the view. The purpose of the AB effect is to inform us of the
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“Significance of electromagnetic potentials in the quantum theory”, as Aharonov
and Bohm’s title says. They identify an ambiguity in the quantum theory of
a charged particle and develop a crucial experiment to resolve the ambiguity.
The topological view is meant to supply a theoretical context in which this
experiment can be seen as crucial and a basis for justifying future developments
of the quantum theory of the electromagnetic interaction. In this section I give a
more detailed statement of the topological view to demonstrate that it involves
no singular limits.
On Shech’s reconstruction, the topological view is committed to a set of
inconsistent claims. The behavior of an electron beam in the vicinity of a magnet
will depend on electromagnetic facts inside the magnet, even when the beam
doesn’t intersect the magnet and the facts inside the magnet have a negligible
effect on the electric and magnetic fields outside of it. In particular, differences
inside the magnet will correspond to different interference patterns on a photo-
graphic plate exposed to the beam. In quantum mechanics, interference patterns
are explained by relative phases between different parts of the wavefunction.
The topological view links the phase in the AB effect to the fact that the region
outside the magnet is topologically nontrivial: it has a “hole” where the magnet
should be. Shech reconstructs this view as committed to four claims:
1. Real systems consist of a simply connected electron configuration space.
2. Real systems display the AB effect.
3. The AB effect occurs if and only if there is a non-trivial relative phase
factor.
4. A non-trivial relative phase factor arises if and only if the electron configu-
ration space is non-simply connected. (Shech, 2018a, 4847)
He argues further that these claims are in tension: “[w]hile the first two proposi-
tions imply that real systems are simply connected and display the AB effect,
the last three propositions convey that real systems are non-simply connected in
virtue of displaying the AB effect” (Shech, 2018a, 4847–8). If this is right, then
the topological view is internally incoherent and should be rejected.
This reconstruction of the topological view is motivated in part by Shech’s
desire to assimilate the AB effect to the philosophical literature on singular limits.
The classic example of a singular limit occurs in discussions of how we are to give
a statistical mechanical underpinning for phenomenological thermodynamics. In
thermodynamics, a phase transition—such as ice melting or water boiling—is
characterized by a discontinuous jump in quantities like entropy. According to
the usual statistical-mechanical reduction recipe, the entropy is a derivative of
the partition function, which is an function of the number of particles in the
statistical-mechanical model of the system. A discontinuous jump in the entropy
therefore leads to a singularity in the partition function. But it turns out that
the partition function can only be singular when the number of particles is
infinite. So we have the following set of inconsistent claims:
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1. real systems have finite[ly many particles]
2. real systems display phase transitions
3. phase transitions occur when the partition function has a singularity
4. phase transitions are governed/described by classical or quantum statistical
mechanics (Callender, 2001, 549)
These claims are inconsistent, because the last three imply that real systems
have infinitely many particles. You might respond to this inconsistency by
rejecting the third claim: while it’s convenient to identify phase transitions with
singularities in the partition function, it would be taking thermodynamics too
seriously to insist that a system must exhibit a singularity to undergo a phase
transition. Proponents of the third claim argue that the identification of phase
transitions with singularities plays some essential role, often concluding that
the fourth claim is false and thermodynamic behavior is emergent in a strong
sense. On this essentialist view, an adequate statistical-mechanical model of
phase transitions must involve an idealization in which the system has infinitely
many particles.2 Shech interprets the topological view as an essentialist view in
this spirit.
Even if Shech’s dialectical motivations are taken into account, I do not
recognize the topological view in his reconstruction. In particular, the topological
view is not analogous to the view that the infinite-particle idealization is essential
for an adequate treatment of phase transitions. For one thing, the topological view
is not concerned with topological properties of a particle’s configuration space
but with topological properties of spacetime regions.3 Of course, the possible
configurations for a particle in some region are just the points of that region that
the particle can occupy, so this is partially a verbal point. More substantively,
Shech characterizes the topological view as involving an essential idealization
because it treats the region outside the magnet as topologically nontrivial. It’s
true that this topological nontriviality is essential to the topological view. But
this isn’t an idealization, it’s just a fact. The region outside of a magnet encloses a
hole occupied by the region containing the magnet, so it’s topologically nontrivial.
To cast the topological view in an essentialist mold there would have to be some
theory that modelled the region outside a magnet as topologically trivial, and
there isn’t one. If the topological view involves an essential idealization, it’s not
one that’s related to the topological facts.
Walking through the details of the topological view shows that it doesn’t
involve essential idealizations anywhere else, either. To begin, recall Aharonov
2Butterfield (2011), Callender (2001), Menon and Callender (2013), and Palacios (2018),
for example, argue that we should reject the third claim. Bangu (2009), Batterman (2005,
2011), and Morrison (2012) give reasons for thinking that the infinite thermodynamic limit is
essential.
3Aharonov and Bohm refer to “singly connected regions” (1959, 486) and Wu and Yang
to “a multiply connection region” (1975, 3845); Batterman claims that “the base space must
be nonsimply connected” (2003, 542), and Nounou attributes the effect to “the topology of
the base manifold” (2003, 193), where these are mathematical representations of spacetime
regions.
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and Bohm’s motivation. They aim to answer a question in the theory of charged
particulate matter: how should we model the electromagnetic field in this
theory? If we work in coordinates the answer can be found in any textbook on
electrodynamics, at least in the classical case. The action of a worldline x for a
particle of mass m and charge q moving in an electromagnetic potential Aµ is
SA(x) =
∫
dτ
(
1
2
mx˙2 + qx˙µAµ
)
where the integral is taken over the interval parametrizing the worldline x and
x˙µ is the worldline’s tangent vector. Interpreted as a coordinate expression,
this integral has a sufficiently clear meaning for the prediction of the particle’s
motion: the curve x is a map from some interval into spacetime that traces out
the particle’s worldline, and the physically possible worldlines are the stationary
points of the action SA. To compute these stationary points it’s enough to know
that m and q are real numbers and Aµ assigns a quadruple of real numbers to
every point in spacetime. That is, it’s enough to know that four scalar fields can
serve as coordinates for the space of electromagnetic fields. But any number of
mathematical objects have such a coordinate expression, so this doesn’t tell us
what we should take the electromagnetic field to be, mathematically speaking.
Computationally, a choice of mathematical model is a choice of which ma-
nipulations are permitted and which proscribed—in particular, it is a choice
of legal substitutions. In our case there are three salient interpretations of the
potential Aµ, each having different substitution rules with respect to a choice of
coordinates:4
1. The electromagnetic field is a covector field, and Aµ are the components of
this covector field in a choice of coordinates. Two covector fields Aµ and
A′µ are inter-substitutable just in case Aµ = A
′
µ for all µ.
2. The electromagnetic field is a principal U(1)-bundle equipped with a
connection, and Aµ are the components of this connection in a choice of
coordinates. Every U(1)-valued function g gives a substitution rule that
replaces Aµ with Aµ − ig ∂µg−1. We say that two potentials Aµ and A′µ
are gauge equivalent if A′µ −Aµ = ig ∂µg−1 for some U(1)-valued function
g.5
3. The electromagnetic field is a field strength tensor Fµν , an antisymmetric
(0, 2)-tensor, and the components of this tensor are a function of Aµ:
Fµν = ∂µAν − ∂νAµ
4Presentations of the topological view vary in how many salient possibilities they admit.
For example, Nounou (2003) gives these three along with a non-separable interpretation in
terms of holonomies assigned to loops. Since the topological view takes the electromagnetic
configuration to be separable, I omit this option (cf. fn. 10).
5More precisely, and because it matters for the AB effect, this description of gauge equiva-
lence should be relativized to the open cover that’s part of the choice of coordinates. That is,
two fields are gauge equivalent if they’re related by a connection-preserving principal bundle
isomorphism that covers the identity.
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Two sets of coordinates Aµ and A
′
µ are inter-substitutable just in case
they give rise to the same field strength tensor; in this case we’ll say that
they’re equipotent.
These possibilities are ordered by the strictness of the corresponding substitution
rule. The equivalence relation on the set of potentials generated by the first
interpretation is just the identity relation, which is the finest equivalence relation.
And the second interpretation generates a finer equivalence relation than the third,
because gauge-equivalent potentials are always equipotent. So the ambiguity
might make a practical difference by manifesting as an ambiguity about which
substitutions are permissible.
Aharonov and Bohm register that in the classical case we can take the
potential Aµ to represent the field strength tensor, as in the third interpretation.
As they say, the potentials Aµ and A
′
µ are interchangeable for all practical
purposes if they generate the same field strength tensor Fµν . For consider the
equations of motion induced by the action. A stationary worldline satisfies the
Lorentz force law
qFµν x˙
ν = mx¨µ
and in the Newtonian framework this is everything: the free modelling parameter
in this framework is the force appearing in Newton’s second law, and in this
model it’s qFµν x˙
ν . Since Newtonian forces suffice to model systems of this
kind, we may suppose that the electromagnetic configuration is entirely captured
by the field strength tensor Fµν . On this reading, two equipotent potentials
represent the same configuration, much like the expressions 1/2 and 2/4 represent
the same rational number.
The quantum-mechanical situation is different. The state of a quantum
particle at time t0 is given by a probability amplitude ψ(t0, x0), where the
second coordinate ranges over all of space. The dynamics are given by an
integral transform
ψ(t1, x1) =
∫
dx0
∫
Dx e i~S(x)ψ(t0, x0)
integrating ψ(t0, x0) against a kernel defined by an integral over all paths x
such that x(t0) = x0 and x(t1) = x1, weighted by a function of the classical
action S and Planck’s constant ~. By contrast with classical matter, we have no
reformulation of these dynamics purely in terms of forces. So in the quantum
model of a charged particle we can’t demonstrate that the field strength tensor
Fµν tracks all the electromagnetic facts by moving to a framework where Fµν is
the only modelling parameter. This does not show that two equipotent potentials
can give different dynamics, but it does prevent us from running an argument
analogous to the argument we ran in the classical case.
All is not lost: in the quantum context we can still rule out the first interpre-
tation of the potential—according to which it’s a covector field—because the
dynamics, “as well as the physical quantities, are all gauge invariant” (Aharonov
and Bohm, 1959, 485). That is, for all practical purposes the physics is invariant
7
source
shield screen
x↑
x↓
Figure 1: The double-slit experiment
under gauge equivalence, as in the interpretation of Aµ as a connection on a
principal U(1)-bundle. If Aµ and A
′
µ are gauge equivalent then the difference
SA′ − SA in the actions they determine will be independent of the path. This
means that the integral transforms they determine will differ by a constant phase,
and because the probability amplitude is only defined up to a phase this means
that Aµ and A
′
µ determine the same quantum dynamics. So for all practical
purposes, gauge-equivalent potentials are interchangeable.
To decide between the equivalence relations of the remaining two interpreta-
tions, we need a situation in which gauge-equivalent potentials are interchangeable
but equipotent potentials are not. This is what Aharonov and Bohm provide.
Such contexts necessarily involve a topologically nontrivial region—that is, a
region that isn’t contractible. For if some region is contractible then the only
principal U(1)-bundle over it is the trivial one, giving every principal U(1)-
connection a global coordinate representation as a covector field Aµ. And if
Aµ and A
′
µ are two equipotent potentials then the covector field A
′
µ −Aµ has
vanishing field strength tensor, so by the Poincare´ lemma there’s a U(1)-valued
function g such that
A′µ −Aµ = ig ∂µg−1
which is to say that Aµ and A
′
µ are gauge equivalent. Over a contractible region
gauge equivalence coincides with equipotence, and there can be no experiments
of the kind we seek.
A topologically nontrivial experiment is easy to find. Consider the paradig-
matic double-slit experiment in Fig. 1. Electrons are emitted from a source, pass
through two slits in a shield, and register on a detector screen. The kernel of
the dynamics in this experimental setup can be separated into one integral over
paths that pass through the slits and one over paths that intersect the shield:∫
Dx e i~S(x) =
∫
slits
Dx e i~S(x) +
∫
shield
Dx e i~S(x)
Treating the shield as an infinite potential barrier suppresses the second integral,
8
so we can safely neglect it. Thus the dynamics are given by an integral over
paths in the region outside the shield. This region is topologically nontrivial,
because a loop around the bit of the shield between the slits can’t be contracted
to a point while remaining in the exterior region.
To turn the double-slit experiment into our crucial experiment we only need
to add an electromagnetic potential Aµ outside the shield. The kernel of the
dynamics then becomes ∫
slits
Dx e i~SA(x)
This expression is gauge-invariant but can change if Aµ is replaced with an
equipotent potential. For an illustration, consider the amplitude at time t1 at
the point x1 on the screen collinear with the source and the point on the shield
between the slits, and suppose that Aµ has vanishing field strength tensor. Then
SA has the same stationary paths as the action of a free particle, since the
classical equations of motion only involve the field strength tensor. If we suppose
that the slits have vanishing width there are then two stationary paths, depicted
in Fig. 1: a path x↑ that passes through the top slit and its reflection x↓ passing
through the bottom slit. Treating the electron source as a point distribution
means that the amplitude coincides with the kernel of the dynamics, and the
stationary phase approximation tells us that in the small-~ limit the amplitude
is proportional to a sum over the stationary points of the action
ψ(t1, x1) ∝ e i~SA(x↑) + e i~SA(x↓)
The relative phase of these two terms is determined by
SA(x↓)− SA(x↑) =
∫ t1
t0
dt x˙µ↓Aµ −
∫ t1
t0
dt x˙µ↑Aµ
since the paths have the same kinetic term. This is the integral of Aµ along the
concatenation of x−1↑ and x↓, which encircles the portion of the shield between
the slits. Since this loop isn’t contractible, this integral may not vanish. Indeed,
it can be made to take any real value by an appropriate choice of a potential
with vanishing field strength tensor.6 It follows that different electromagnetic
potentials can lead to different amounts of interference between the two classical
paths and thus different detection probability distributions over the screen, even
when all of the potentials under consideration have the same field strength tensor.
Experiment can now decide between the principal connection and field
strength tensor interpretation. Run a double-slit experiment in the presence
of an electromagnetic field. If the potential is the coordinate expression of a
principal connection then gauge-inequivalent but equipotent potentials will lead
to different patterns on the detector screen; this is the AB effect. If there is no
AB effect—that is, if equipotent fields always lead to the same wave pattern on
the detector screen—then we can continue to use the coarser equivalence relation
6For example, the covector field given by dθ/2pi in polar coordinates centered on the point
of the shield between the slits has unit integral around the loop.
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generated by the field strength tensor.7 Of course, as with any experiment there
are implementation details. But insofar as we are concerned with the question
of interpretation that Aharonov and Bohm set out to answer, these details are
beside the point.
This positive characterization of the topological view in hand, return to
Shech’s set of incompatible claims. The versions of these claims that the
topological view actually endorses are something like the following.
1. There is a contractible spacetime region containing the AB apparatus.
2. The AB apparatus displays the AB effect.
3. The AB effect occurs if and only if there is a nontrivial phase factor.
4. A nontrivial phase factor arises only over a non-contractible region.
Only the fourth of these claims is distinctive of the topological view. Indeed, I
take it that the fourth claim is constitutive of the topological view, alongside the
theoretical context just reviewed in which the AB effect is a crucial experiment
to license the “only”. The other three claims seem both true and uncontroversial.
The laboratory room containing the AB apparatus is contractible. The second
claim is empirical, and its truth settles Aharonov and Bohm’s motivating question.
The quantum-mechanical explanation for the effect appeals to the phase between
the paths through the top slit and those through the bottom one, as in every
explanation of the wave patterns observed in a double-slit experiment, so the
third claim is a commitment to modelling the particulate matter quantum-
mechanically. These four claims are non-contradictory, and on the topological
view they’re true. In particular, there is no contradiction between the fact that
the inside of the room containing the AB apparatus is contractible while the
region outside the shield isn’t; different regions can have different properties.
Shech’s general critique of the topological view fails, because the topological
view is not committed to the inconsistent set of claims he attributes to it. He
thinks that the view fails “to tell a story about why the idealized AB effect,
conventionally defined so as to necessitate a [non-simply-connected] configuration
space, has anything to do with the concrete AB effect as it is manifested in the
laboratory” (2018a, 4845). But this is just the story on offer: the region of the
laboratory outside the shield is topologically nontrivial. So on the topological
view, the AB effect doesn’t involve any idealizations about spacetime regions,
nor does my presentation appear to involve essential idealizations about anything
else. But I glossed over the idealization that Shech and Earman are mainly
concerned with when I said that we could neglect contributions from paths that
7Note that a null result would be a problem for the quantum theory: the theory predicts
different amounts of interference for equipotent potentials, so at most one of these predictions
can be correct. If the AB effect weren’t present then the quantum theory would make
incompatible (hence false) predictions. This problem is sometimes obscured by a focus on
Aharonov and Bohm’s simplification to vanishing field strength tensors, since it might naively
be thought that the vanishing electromagnetic potential is somehow special among potentials
with vanishing field strength tensor.
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intersect the shield. Unlike the topological features of the magnet’s exterior, this
is an idealization, and for all I’ve said it’s the kind of infinite idealization that
interests Shech. Now I’ll argue that it’s not.
3 Ancillary idealizations
In light of the last section, Shech’s complaint against the topological view
seems to misfire. He finds the topological view inadequate because it fails to
address details of the experimental implementation that Aharonov and Bohm
propose—in particular, details about the shield. Earman, too, complains that the
philosophical literature doesn’t “show much awareness of the subtleties required
to implement the idealizations involved in the AB effect” (2019, 2017). But from
the perspective of the topological view, it’s hard to see why these details are
relevant. There are two possibilities. If the complaint is only that the topological
view doesn’t address these details then so be it; Shech and Earman’s comments
are friendly supplements to the view. But some of their remarks seem to be
arguments against the interpretation of the AB effect mooted in §2. That is,
they may instead be arguing that the field strength tensor does indeed capture
all the electromagnetic facts.
The topological view envisions the AB effect as a crucial experiment. On a
naive reading, this means that there are two possible contradictory outcomes, one
of which is deductively entailed by the principal connection interpretation and the
other by the field strength tensor interpretation. The outcome of the experiment
confirms one interpretation and falsifies the other. There are therefore two kinds
of objections to the topological view. A narrow objection might accept the
topological view’s theoretical narrative but balk at its claims about the empirical
facts. The topological view is silent on the battery of auxiliary assumptions
required to actually test the AB effect, and you might worry that the AB effect
has never in fact been realized in the laboratory. Such worries might concern the
realization of the necessary electromagnetic fields, the magnitude of the effect, or
similar. More broadly, you might reject the topological view’s framing entirely.
That is, you might argue that the principal connection interpretation and the
field strength tensor interpretation aren’t the only two options.
We can read Shech and Earman’s remarks with either the narrow or broad
objections in mind. The heart of their complaint is that the topological view
doesn’t specify enough features of the AB experiment. In particular, the topolog-
ical view doesn’t reckon with an ambiguity that arises in the context of infinite
potential barriers. As an illustration of this ambiguity, consider a quantum
particle confined to the interval [0, 1] by an infinite potential at either end.
According to the Hamiltonian quantization recipe, the configuration space for
this particle is the Hilbert space L2[0, 1] of square-integrable functions on [0, 1]
and its dynamics are of the form
ψ(t1) = e
−i(t1−t0)Hψ(t0)
with H a densely-defined self-adjoint operator. Furthermore, on its domain H
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takes the form of the classical Hamiltonian with the momentum replaced by an
operator acting as −i~∇; in our case this means
H = − ~
2
2m
∇2
with m the particle’s mass. Since H is unbounded and self-adjoint its domain
must be some strict subset of the Hilbert space, but the quantization recipe
gives us no guidance as to what this domain should be. So the Hamiltonian
quantization recipe leaves the dynamics undefined; it tells us only how H acts,
not what operator it is, and so we cannot exponentiate it to give the dynamics.
This is a real ambiguity, because in general there will be more than one self-
adjoint operator satisfying the Hamiltonian quantization recipe’s requirements
(Reed and Simon, 1975, X.1). The Hamiltonian in the previous paragraph is
naturally associated with many dense domains. We might choose a relatively
small domain like the set of smooth functions with compact support in (0, 1),
giving an operator H∞. Or we might choose a relatively large domain like the
set of continuously-differentiable functions ψ such that Hψ is square-integrable,
giving an operator H∗∞. We might also consider domains consisting of smooth
functions that satisfy some boundary conditions. For example, choosing the
Dirichlet boundary condition ψ(0) = ψ(1) = 0 gives an operator HD, and
choosing the Neumann boundary condition ψ′(0) = ψ′(1) = 0 gives an operator
HN . Not every choice of domain gives a self-adjoint operator: for example, the
adjoint of H∞ is the distinct operator H∗∞. But some domains do give self-
adjoint operators, like HD and HN . Indeed, there are infinitely many self-adjoint
operators on L2[0, 1] that act as H on their domain, each giving rise to distinct
dynamics.
The discussion of §2 made no reference to the Hamiltonian’s domain, so Shech
and Earman are right that the topological view doesn’t address this ambiguity.
But it’s not obvious that this ambiguity needs addressing. As I argue in §3.1, it
would be inappropriate for the topological view to address the difference between
the Hamiltonians HD and HN because this difference isn’t relevant to the status
of the electromagnetic field. The choice between HD and HN concerns how to
model shielded magnets in particular experimental setups. It’s therefore of a
piece with questions about how to model the source and screen in the double-slit
experiment, and none of these are the topological view’s responsibility. However,
changing the theoretical framing of the experiment might change our demands
on an account of the AB effect. In §3.2 I consider an alternative framing that
Shech and Earman might have in mind, according to which the AB experiment
is set up to investigate a remote counterfactual world. Set in this frame, Shech
and Earman are proposing an alternative to the topological view, but it’s hard
to see what the virtues of this alternative are. Characterizing the AB apparatus
as a “fictional system” Earman (2019, 1992) and the effect as one that “cannot
be manifested in the laboratory” Shech (2018a, 4840) reduces it to a curiosity
disconnected from the rest of our theorizing about electromagnetism.
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3.1 Auxiliary assumptions
Shech argues “that the topological approach does not offer a satisfying justifi-
cation for choosing the standard Dirichlet boundary conditions that pick out a
unique self-adjoint extension of the Hamiltonian operator representing actual
systems in which the AB effect manifests” (2018a, 4840). To fill this gap, Shech
calls on a result of de Oliveira and Pereira (2008). Earman agrees with Shech
that this is a gap that needs filling, adding that “[p]art of the justification is
supplied by a pretty mathematical result, but also needed is a fleshing out of
the idealization with additional stories about how the fictional attributes are
realized” (2019, 1994).
It’s true that the topological view doesn’t try to justify Dirichlet boundary
conditions, but it’s not a problem. Just the opposite: I take it to be an adequacy
condition on an account of the AB effect that it not justify these boundary
conditions. Boundary conditions play no role in the AB effect as described in §2,
so pronouncing on them would be overstepping the bounds of the account. As an
illustration, the rest of this subsection surveys the constellation of approximations,
idealizations, and auxiliary hypotheses that surround the AB effect on the
topological view. You can find boundary conditions here if you look hard enough,
but the connection to the AB effect is severely attenuated. So attenuated, in
fact, that the AB effect has no necessary connection to any specific boundary
conditions—in particular, it does not require Dirichlet boundary conditions. So
it’s a good thing the topological view doesn’t imply them.
The discussion of §2 was qualitative, rather than quantitative, because
the topological view is an interpretation of the AB experiment. Qualitative
characterization is one of the aims of interpretation, for a number of reasons.
Quantitative descriptions issue from qualitative ones but not vice versa, in
general. Moreover, the more we bind the AB effect to particular contexts, the
less useful it is. If we understand the AB effect as a crucial experiment as the
topological view suggests then we have learned something general about the
electromagnetic interaction; if we understand it as the behavior of electrons
in a particular apparatus we have learned something specific about a peculiar
experimental setup. Relatedly, a qualitative analysis affords a more robust
network of connections between the AB effect and the laboratory. If the AB
effect were confined to the schematic cartoon of Fig. 1 then we would have
no experimental access to it: among other things, there are more than two
dimensions, and sources, shields, and screens have three-dimensional extensions.
A qualitative story about the effect gives us other setups in which the effect
manifests along with quantitative measures of how well some particular laboratory
setup instantiates the schematic double-slit experiment of Fig. 1.
Because the topological view gives a qualitative account of the AB effect, it
affords us necessary flexibility in choosing which approximations and idealizations
to impose. The discussion of §2 was heavily approximate and idealized so as to
avoid any explicit computations, but for convincing experiments the approxima-
tions must be better and the idealizations weaker. For the approximations and
idealizations of our toy double-slit experiment, this is straightforward. Standard
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perturbation theory gives us the kernel of the dynamics to arbitrary order in
~, taking us well beyond the stationary phase approximation. Depending on
what idealizations we impose, we may even be able to give a non-perturbative
expression for the dynamics. We can replace the point distribution model of
the electron source with something more realistic that depends on the source’s
features, making the convolution nontrivial. A more realistic model of the slits
in the screen would give them finite width, giving more paths over which to
integrate when computing the perturbative expansion of the dynamics. We can
also drop the assumption that the field strength tensor vanishes; indeed, the
system will be influenced by the Earth’s electromagnetic field, the electron’s
emission and absorption of stray Z bosons, and the gravitational influence of
Sagittarius A∗.
If boundary conditions are relevant to the AB effect, they must appear
somewhere on the spectrum described in the previous paragraph. It would be
comically inappropriate to include gravitational corrections in an account of
the AB effect. For conceptual or pedagogical purposes the level of description
in §2 is adequate. It even suffices for the laboratory, if we characterize the
AB effect as covariation of the interference fringes with the electromagnetic
potential that goes beyond their covariation with the field strength. Higher
orders of the dynamics or contributions from the finite size of the source and
shield slits won’t create or obscure the effect, and all we need for confirmation
of the AB effect is to see whether the interference fringes appreciably change
when the magnetic flux changes with everything else held effectively constant.
The de-idealizations in the previous paragraph are relevant if—and to the extent
that—we can use them to help pin down the meanings of “appreciably” and
“effectively” in this criterion of confirmation and respond to skeptical analyses
of particular experiments.8 More formally, they are useful for estimating the
magnitude of the effect and systematic errors. The size of the slits matters
because it controls the envelope of the diffraction pattern. We can’t observe
the AB effect in a double-slit apparatus with very large slits, but this isn’t
disconfirmation; it’s an inappropriately high standard for significant observable
differences. The gravitational influence of celestial bodies doesn’t matter, and
it’s so weak that an informal order-of-magnitude estimate makes this obvious;
the environment of an AB apparatus is effectively constant no matter what some
star is doing. If Shech and Earman are right that the topological view neglects
important details about boundary conditions, then there must be some boundary
effect that threatens to swamp the size of the AB effect or generate significant
systematic error. To respond to this worry we can step through the most salient
idealizations and check that they pose no significant problems.
The idealizations in the setup of the double-slit experiment are inessential,
according to the topological view. First, shields found in the laboratory will
obviously be imperfect, so the kernel of the total dynamics will not be given
by an integral over paths confined to the exterior region. For the AB effect to
decide our crucial question we need only find some equipotent potentials Aµ and
8Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for providing a helpful framing of this point.
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A′µ such that ∫
slits
Dx e i~SA′ (x) 6=
∫
slits
Dx e i~SA(x)
for then Aµ and A
′
µ won’t be interchangeable. If all the shielding is perfectly
good then these will be the only terms of the dynamics. If the shield is imperfect
then the interference observed in the lab will also have contributions from paths
that penetrate the shield. The second standard idealization sets the double slit
experiment in two dimensions rather than three. The dominant contributions
to the dynamics will be the classical paths, which lie in the plane of the source
and slits, so the two-dimensional approximation will generally be good. But
contributions from the dimension perpendicular to the page can be incorporated
in the usual way as necessary.
So much for the approximations and idealizations of §2. That section’s
discussion was also silent on many details of experimental implementation. For
example, it simply assumed the possibility of a shield that could effectively
prevent transmission of an electron beam. This is the proper attitude; as just
noted, the topological view makes no quantitative claims about the details of
the shielding, it supposes only that the contributions from paths that intersect
the shielding can be effectively distinguished from the contributions from the
paths of interest. The topological view must be consistent with effective shields,
of course. For instance, if the shielding is effectively perfect then it must be
acceptable to assume that the electron’s amplitude effectively vanishes at the
shield. But this is compatible with the topological view, since the amplitude at
the shield is given entirely by paths that intersect the shield. A more detailed
treatment of the shield must appeal to facts about the shield itself. This might
be a basic analysis in terms of reflection and transmission coefficients or might
be a more detailed analysis that accounts for the material composition of the
shield and the backscatter profile of electrons off a crystal of this kind. Either
way, none of these details fall within the topological view’s remit.
In fact, the standard double-slit experiment itself is inessential. Good thing,
too: the electron’s short wavelength means the slits, their separation, and the
interference fringes would be impractically small in any experiment possible
in Aharonov and Bohm’s time (Marton et al., 1954, 1100). I introduced this
experiment in §2 as an illustration of an experiment in which a topologically
nontrivial region is salient, and I chose it because it’s a familiar and paradig-
matic example. But at the time Aharonov and Bohm were writing, electron
interferometry had only recently become practical with Mo¨llenstedt and Du¨ker’s
(1956) development of the electron biprism. This is the interferometry method
Chambers (1960) used in the first experimental incarnation of the effect. Later
tests use a modified double-slit setup proposed as a “crucial experiment” by
Kuper (1980). In each case the region exterior to the shield and electromag-
netic source is still topologically nontrivial, raising the possibility of equipotent
but gauge-inequivalent potentials, and the interference pattern observed on the
screen will be invariant under gauge equivalence but not equipotence. So, again,
these alternative setups will exhibit an experimental signature of the principal
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connection interpretation of the potential, if it’s correct.
The same remarks apply just as well to the detector screen. The account of
§2 leads to a particular quantum amplitude for the points on the screen, but
experimental access to this amplitude is mediated by a choice of apparatus.
Traditionally this would be a photographic plate, and a completely detailed
analysis would require a story about how the quantum amplitude is transduced
to a pattern on this plate. This might involve an analysis of the interaction
between the incident electron and the silver halide in the photographic plate, the
subsequent emission of an electron from the silver halide and absorption by a
nearby silver ion, the development and fixing of the image, and so forth. Modern
electron microscopes amplify and transduce the electron signal to a digital image
in any number of ways, each of which would require their own analysis. These
details are necessary for connecting the quantum amplitude to observation, but
they’re not part of the AB effect.
We can run these changes one more time on the remaining piece of the AB ex-
periment, the electromagnetic potential. The earliest experiments generated the
requisite electromagnetic potentials either with a permanently magnetized iron
whisker or a small solenoid. The solenoid affords a particularly nice qualitative
picture of how you might generate equipotent but gauge-inequivalent potentials,
since it can be found in any introductory textbook and supports a number of
tricks for avoiding explicit computation. Suppose that the plane of Fig. 1 is
transverse to the midpoint of a long, thin solenoid embedded in the shield at
the point between the slits. Recall that near the midpoint of a long solenoid
the magnetic field is constant and parallel to the axis of symmetry within the
solenoid and vanishes outside of it. It follows that the electric field vanishes
everywhere, so that the field strength tensor vanishes outside the solenoid. But
by Stokes’ theorem the integral determining the relative phase of the upper and
lower paths must be the magnetic flux through the solenoid’s interior. Since this
will be constant and nonzero the potential outside the solenoid will be constant
and nonzero as well, making it equipotent with but gauge-inequivalent to the
vanishing potential. Schematically this is an illuminating picture, but in practice
it’s hard to fabricate and compute the systematic error for. The potential from a
ferromagnetic filament—or, better, toroid—is better suited to this purpose, and
appears in more experimental implementations of the AB effect.9 Like the shield
and the screen, a careful analysis of the electromagnetic potential must be able
to account for the details of the magnet’s composition and inhomogeneities in the
generated potentials. Thankfully, these details are yet again of little relevance
to the topological view, which simply requests gauge-inequivalent equipotent
potentials obtained in any which way.
The noodling in the last six paragraphs is meant to show by example that
these experimental details just aren’t relevant to the topological view. It just
doesn’t matter how you generate the electromagnetic potentials, or how you
9Chambers (1960), Fowler et al. (1961), and Boersch et al. (1962) used ferromagnetic
whiskers or films, and Tonomura and collaborators toroidal magnets (e.g., 1982; 1986).
Mo¨llenstedt and Bayh (1962) used a solenoid. See Tonomura (2010) for a more detailed
review of these experiments.
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detect the predicted phase shift, or how you perform electron interferometry.
It matters that you do these things if you’d like to confirm the AB effect, but
the topological view won’t tell you what choices to make; these are determined
by practical matters. It’s surely not the case that the topological view must
explain how photographic plates work, nor is it a view about electron biprisms
or permalloy toroids.
But these are just the grounds of Shech and Earman’s criticism: the topolog-
ical view doesn’t justify a particular model of a shielded solenoid, and they think
this a shortcoming. In particular, the topological view doesn’t give us a reason to
make the domain of the Hamiltonian the set of smooth functions with Dirichlet
boundary conditions at the shield. This is no surprise, since the topological view
doesn’t talk about boundary conditions or solenoids. Boundary conditions didn’t
even arise in the preceding discussion of satellite issues of experimental imple-
mentation. We skirted close to the context of this complaint when discussing the
schematic solenoid that might generate the needed electromagnetic potential,
but at that point we’d already ranged far from the topological view’s domain. It
would be a mark against the topological view if it made specific recommendations
about how to model solenoids, since few experimental realizations of the AB
effect involve solenoids at all.
In fact, if the topological view justified Dirichlet boundary conditions then it
would not merely be overstepping its bounds, it would be flatly wrong. Not only
do boundary conditions lie outside the topological view’s purview, the boundary
conditions that Shech and Earman want justified aren’t necessary for modelling
the AB effect in the presence of a solenoid. On the topological view, the AB
effect requires only that∫
Dx e i~SA′ (x) −
∫
Dx e i~SA(x) 6=
∫
shield
Dx e i~SA′ (x) −
∫
shield
Dx e i~SA(x)
Boundary conditions might make a difference to the terms on the right hand
side, but these are details the topological view leaves aside: if an apparatus
instantiates this inequality then it instantiates the AB effect, and if it doesn’t
it doesn’t. We shouldn’t demand that the right hand side be worked out using
Dirichlet boundary conditions, because infinitely many other boundary conditions
will do the job just as well. We could use Neumann boundary conditions, as
Earman (2019, 2006) notes, and even more options become available if we lift the
assumption of perfect shielding. It would be a problem for the topological view
if it justified Dirichlet boundary conditions over Neumann boundary conditions,
because that would wrongly tie the AB effect to irrelevant features of particular
treatments of particular experimental realizations of the effect.
The topological view ought not justify Dirichlet boundary conditions when
modelling a solenoid. So I think Shech can’t be right when he says that
it is exactly this type of work . . . that offers both an explanation of
the AB effect as it manifests in the physical world, and a justification
for appealing to the type of idealizations that arise in such a context.
(2018a, 4851)
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Shech envisions this work as analogous to the work you have to do in the
thermodynamic context to justifiably reject the claim that phase transitions are
singularities in the partition function. But the topological view does not appeal
to any singularities. If an explanation of the AB effect requires a close study of
the boundary conditions for the electromagnetic source then it also requires a
close study of the boundary conditions for the shield and screen. If we choose to
model these as infinite potential barriers then—as with any infinite barriers—we
will encounter issues about domains of our operators. If a justification of these
domains requires a physical story that refers to the composition of the source
then it also requires a physical story about the metal composing the shield
and the emulsion of silver salts on the photographic plate. These demands are
implausibly weighty. But if they really are requirements then the topological
view just doesn’t aim to explain the AB effect or justify the idealizations used
to model a particular instantiation of the AB experiment, at least not by itself.
It aims only to contribute a model of the interaction between a charged particle
and an electromagnetic potential. An explanation of the AB effect will then join
the topological view with the materials science that explains the behavior of
the shield and the photochemistry that explains the behavior of the screen and
the classical electrodynamics that explains the behavior of the electromagnetic
source. Boundary conditions might enter in this last explanation, or they might
not. If they do then this explanation is complementary to the topological view,
which is concerned with a wholly separate part of the AB experiment.
3.2 Alternative interpretations
My reading of Shech and Earman in §3.1 must be wrong, since they mean to
offer a competitor to the topological view rather than a complement. If we adopt
the topological view then they seem to be attending to details of experimental
implementation unrelated to the topological view, but they do not see their
arguments this way. So perhaps we should reject the topological view’s framing
of the matter. We can read Shech and Earman as proposing an alternative
explanation of the AB effect, undermining its status as a crucial experiment by
increasing the number of salient alternatives. In particular, they point out that
the topological view assumes a kind of locality which you might question. If we
remove this assumption then the AB effect is no longer a crucial experiment, and
we need a new framing. Earman offers a holistic one on which the AB effect is
an epiphenomenon and Aharonov and Bohm’s question cannot arise for realistic
systems.
Earman suggests that we take the AB effect to answer a remote counterfactual:
how would an electron behave in the vicinity of a perfectly shielded, infinitely
long solenoid (2019, 1994–5)? The counterfactual nature of this question is
emphasized by both: Shech remarks that “the AB effect cannot be manifested
in the laboratory” (2018a, fn. 1) and Earman that “the target system in the AB
effect is a fictional system” (2019, 1993). For both, the AB effect is a prediction
about what would be observed in a world that lacks the limitations of our
world’s matter and engineering. This world is very different from ours, but we
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might expect our theory of charged quantum matter to pronounce on it anyway.
For Shech and Earman, the AB effect is one such otherworldly pronouncement.
While the motivation for this counterfactual question is unclear, this reading
seems to be behind some of the reception of the early tests of the AB effect, as
Earman (2019, §7) explains.
The topological view gives a straightforward answer Earman’s counterfactual
question because the topological view assumes that electromagnetism is local.
More precisely, the salient options on the topological view are all separable: the
electromagnetic state of some region determines and supervenes on the states of
its subregions.10 Any geometric object over some region restricts to a geometric
object over each of that region’s subregions, and if two geometric objects differ
then there is some point at which they differ. We can therefore sensibly attribute
an electromagnetic state to any given region on any of the three interpretations
that the topological view considers, and this state will be independent of the
states of regions disjoint from our region of interest. For a local theory of this
kind, counterfactuals about worlds with nontrivial topologies are little different
from counterfactuals about regions of our world with nontrivial topologies. So
the topological view’s treatment of Earman’s counterfactual is more or less the
discussion in §2.
Non-local theories can also answer this question, but the connection between
theory and experiment is more involved. Both Shech and Earman seem to adopt
a kind of holism on which there is one spatial region, one electron configuration
space, one electromagnetic configuration space, and one indecomposable relation
between the electromagnetic field’s configuration space and the electron’s dynam-
ics. For example, they both speak of “the” configuration space of the electron.
And as a result of this holism, the features of the AB effect, “although compatible
with [quantum mechanics], are never realized in the actual world” (Earman,
2019, 1993). The AB effect concerns the relationship between configurations of
the electromagnetic field and the dynamics of an electron moving in that field.
In particular, it concerns this relationship in the region outside a magnet. But
if we adopt the suggested holism we are allowed only one spatial region, one
electron configuration space, and one Hamiltonian per experiment. In particular,
and contra the topological view, an electron moving outside of a solenoid can
never inform us about the AB effect: the electron’s wavefunction will extend
into the solenoid and we will be forced to attend to the electromagnetic field at
every point of space. Or, at least, no electron can inform us about the AB effect
on its own.
On a holistic view like this, predictions about worlds featuring infinite
potentials must be obtained by appeal to a somewhat informal principle of
continuity. As an illustration, return to the particle in an infinite potential
well. On the holistic view this model is experimentally inaccessible because we
can only generate finite potential barriers. That is, we only have experimental
access to particles whose configuration space is of the form L2(R). However,
10 In asserting this I am agreeing with those like Dougherty (2017) over those like Healey
(2007) and those like Myrvold (2011) on the separability of the principal connection interpreta-
tion.
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we can experimentally probe the particle in a box by considering a sequence of
Hamiltonians of the form
HV =
{
− ~22m∇2 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
− ~22m∇2 + V otherwise
where V is some positive constant. It happens that in this case we can ignore
questions about HV ’s domain, because there is an essentially unique choice
that makes it self-adjoint. For any V we can test the predictions of quantum
mechanics; for example, when V is very large the lowest levels of the particle’s
energy spectrum will be approximately
En ' ~
2
2m
n2pi2
with En the nth energy level. In the limit of large V this approximate equality
becomes exact for all n and coincides with the spectrum of the operator HD
on L2[0, 1]. So, you might argue, the Hamiltonian for a particle confined by
infinite potentials is HD, and we can test this by investigating particles whose
Hamiltonian is HV for increasingly large V .
Both Shech and Earman seem to have a picture like this in mind, though they
diverge on the details. Shech argues that a story like this applies in the case of
the AB effect as well. The specifics differ: we are interested in square-integrable
functions on the exterior of the shield, rather than those on the interval [0, 1], and
the relevant Hamiltonians are more complicated.11 But as Shech explains, the
general picture is the same: we consider a family of “more realistic” Hamiltonians
on L2(R3) parametrized by the strength of the shielding and then argue that
in the limit of infinitely strong shielding we recover the analogue of HD on the
Hilbert space of wavefunctions supported outside the shielding (2018a, 4848).
So, he concludes, the correct explanation and understanding of the AB effect
appeals to the existence and uniqueness of the domains making HV self-adjoint
over L2(R3) combined with the behavior of these operators in the limit of large
V .
Earman’s conclusion is more skeptical than Shech’s. Though he signs on
to the same general picture, Earman demands some further justification of
the principle of continuity. The problem is that the Hamiltonians HD and HN
corresponding to Dirichlet and Neumann boundary conditions are both physically
possible, and they give different physical predictions. The choice between them
in any particular context is an empirical matter. As a consequence, the choice
11There’s also an interesting difference in the specific realization of the technical problem
this limit is meant to solve. The two cases are similar in that the particle’s configuration
space supports unitarily inequivalent representations of the Heisenberg algebra, and these
can be classified by the boundary conditions satisfied by the corresponding Hamiltonian. For
the particle in a box the momentum operators in the different representations differ in their
domains, while for the AB setup the momentum operators in the different representations
differ only in their action on vectors. See Earman (2019, §6) for a more detailed discussion of
the connection between the multiplicity of representations and the domain of the momentum
operator.
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of limiting sequence is also an empirical matter. The original counterfactual
question has no determinate answer on Earman’s version of the holistic view,
because it doesn’t specify which sequences of worlds or states of the world we
are to consider, nor the similarity relation that determines which of various
possibilities counts as the one approximated by our laboratory investigations.
That said, he grants that
while the details of the answer to the what-would-happen question
may depend on how the details of the what-if scenario are filled in,
the existence of observable effects in the behavior of the electron
reflecting the strength of the magnetic flux inside the solenoid do not
so depend (2019, 2007).
This more conservative version of the holistic view can’t give a fully detailed
answer to the counterfactual question on the table, because this question is
ill-posed by its lights. But it does assert that there will be a nontrivial phase
shift of some kind.
It’s hard to find common ground between the topological view and the holistic
one. The two views give the same answer to Earman’s counterfactual, so cannot
be distinguished on that basis. And appealing to other features of the views
are likely to presuppose the framing of one or the other. Does one of these
views give a better explanation of the AB effect, though the predictions are the
same? Shech and Earman can’t give a good explanation (says the topological
view), because they don’t mention the most important feature of the AB effect:
the difference between equipotence and gauge equivalence. Moreover, their
discussion is too narrow and too broad: it is silent on actual instances of the AB
effect—in which no infinite barriers appear—and applies just as well to systems
with no interesting electromagnetic features, like a particle confined to a box
or an ordinary double-slit experiment. Contrariwise (Shech and Earman might
say), the topological view can’t account for the AB effect because its neglect
of boundary conditions “hides a seething complexity in the different ways the
Hamiltonian operator can be made self-adjoint” (Earman, 2019, 2001). And it’s
the topological view that’s too broad and too narrow, because it thinks that the
AB effect can be manifested in the laboratory and does not assimilate it to other
systems with infinite barriers.
If we follow Earman in taking the AB effect to concern the behavior of an
otherworldly electron then we lose common ground on which to evaluate the
topological view and the holistic alternative. On this framing the AB effect
involves an idealized infinite solenoid by stipulation, making it essential to the
effect in some sense, but on this limited definition any view must count it
essential. Part of the disagreement over whether there is an essential idealization
therefore concerns what counts as the AB effect. The two views give the same
predictions in uncontroversial cases of the AB effect, and the virtues of each
view only appear in the light of cases that the other view doesn’t count as an
instance of the AB effect at all. Barring any internal incoherence in one view
or the other, any choice between the two will be entangled with the choice of
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target domain and more general principles like locality.12 So this is a case of
contrastive underdetermination. But it’s an odd one, for it concerns two ways of
justifying the answer to a remote, unmotivated counterfactual question. And
from a perspective this general it’s not obvious what could be gained by resolving
the underdetermination. However, on the topological view the stakes are high:
the AB effect is central to our justification for the standard quantum model of
the electromagnetic interaction.
4 The non-relativistic idealization
The topological view involves no essential idealization in the sense that inter-
ests Shech, but there’s idealization to be found in “the bastardized theory in
which a quantized electron is subjected an external classical electromagnetic
field” (Earman, 2019, 2013). This setup idealizes away relativistic effects and
quantum features of the electromagnetic field. But the topological view doesn’t
claim that the AB effect would disappear if we adopted a more fundamental
description of the system. Indeed, this is the point of taking the AB effect to be
a “crucial experiment” in spite of the fact that there are non-local alternative
interpretations. This is a typical use of “crucial” experiments. The point is not
that the principal connection interpretation has no competitors, but that we may
take the principal connection interpretation to be established for the purposes of
further theory development. In particular, we can assume the principal connec-
tion interpretation when arguing about quantum theories of the electromagnetic
interaction. And this is what the standard model of this interaction, quantum
electrodynamics (QED), does. Rejecting the topological view means giving up
part of the justification for QED and for specific applications of it. Of course, if
the topological view is wrong then this supposed justification is merely apparent.
But an alternative interpretation of the AB effect isn’t a true competitor to the
topological view unless it can also play a comparable role in our story about
QED.
I have been attributing to the topological view the idea that the AB effect is
a crucial experiment, but this idea is fraught. As Duhem (1906, VI.3) argued,
crucial experiments in the strict sense are impossible in physics: hypotheses in
physics can never be tested in isolation but only alongside a whole system of
hypotheses. Subjecting Aharonov and Bohm’s prediction to an experimental
test as in §3.1 requires a host of hypotheses about the shield, screen, and sources,
and many of these hypotheses concern electromagnetic behavior, which is exactly
what we aim to be testing. And the AB effect can’t be strictly deciding between
two options, because there are more than two possibilities. Plausibly, the features
12I’m not certain that the view I’ve reconstructed from Shech and Earman’s remarks is
internally coherent. In particular, it’s not obvious how to connect (for example) the behavior
of the operator HV on L
2(R) in the large-V limit to the behavior of the operator HD on
L2[0, 1]. It would be straightforward if you thought that the system between the two infinite
potential walls could be sensibly attributed a state space and dynamics, and that in the limit
this subsystem approximated the system with state space L2[0, 1] and dynamics HD . But this
kind of separability is exactly what Shech and Earman’s holism denies.
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of this case are generic. Experiments require apparatus with their own theories,
and logically possible alternatives lurk around every corner. So the topological
view can’t be saying that the AB effect is a crucial experiment in this sense.
But there’s a different sense of “crucial experiment” on which the topological
view can claim that the AB effect is crucial. This sense is reflected in any number
of examples; for instance, return to the double-slit experiment.
1. The paradigmatic status of this experiment begins with Young, who first
described it as a demonstration of destructive interference of light in
lectures given in 1802 and 1803. He thought these experiments “simple
and. . . demonstrative” (1804, 1) evidence for the wave theory of light
over the emission theory, and later commentators often refer to these
experiments as crucial. For example, Arago found these experiments so
compelling that his 1832 encomium of Young sought in part to explain
why all were not instantly converted to the wave theory.13
2. In 1819 the French Academy awarded a prize on the topic of diffraction.
At the time, Laplace’s emission theory of light was dominant in France
and on the prize committee: the only non-Laplacian judges were Arago
and Gay-Lussac, and the latter’s interests lay outside optics. Fresnel’s
winning memoir was a wave-theoretic treatment, and one of the Laplacian
judges noted a simple consequence of Fresnel’s theory: the appearance
of a spot of light at the center of a circular object’s shadow. Folklore
has it that, despite the heavy opposition to the wave theory, “French
resistance collapsed suddenly and relatively completely” (Kuhn, 1962, 155)
when Arago exhibited this white spot experimentally, and the committee
bestowed Fresnel the award.14
3. Duhem illustrates the impossibility of a crucial experiment with Foucault’s
1850 measurement of the relative speed of light in air and water. Arago
explicitly proposed this measurement as a crucial experiment meant to
subject the emission and wave theories to “decisive tests” that would
“unequivocally” decide whether light was composed of particles or waves
(1838, 954, my translation).
In none of these three cases did the putatively crucial experiment lead to mass
conversion; the wave theory became dominant in the 1830s, twenty years after
Young’s experiment and twenty before Foucault’s. Nor did it lead to local
conversion. Fresnel’s prize committee mentions the bright spot only briefly, and
the word “wave” does not occur in their report. If any of the Laplacians on
the prize committee converted to the wave theory, it was not before the 1830s.
Nor was this lack of conversion obviously irrational. Young’s experiments were
variations on Grimaldi’s well-known diffraction experiments from 1665, and
emission theorists had developed their own story about destructive interference
13See Worrall (1976) for extensive analysis of Young’s experiments, their reception, and their
status as crucial. See Arago (1857) for a translation of his encomium.
14On this episode and the problems with the folklore, see Worrall (1989).
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before Young came onto the scene. Moreover, the emission theory claimed crucial
experiments of its own, which Newton marshalled in favor of his emission theory,
and Young had no response to these. So none of these were crucial experiments
in the strict sense. Nevertheless, all three are indeed crucial experiments in a
relevant sense, at least if we adopt the wave theory of light.
Calling some experiment “crucial” means giving it a special theoretical status.
As Lakatos often put it, the term “crucial” is an honorific. An experiment is
crucial if it forcefully exhibits some important theoretical principle. These will
necessarily be theory-bound. When Whewell says that Young’s work “certainly
ought to have convinced all scientific men of the truth of [the wave theory]” (1837,
406) we should disagree on a historical reading of the claim: the wave theory
was severely underpowered before Fresnel gave it a mathematical underpinning,
and the emission theory had plenty of other successes. But we can also read
Whewell—and Arago, in his encomium of Young—as claiming that Young’s
experiments isolate one of the fundamental principles of the wave theory, and
this is true. If only Young’s contemporaries had access to Fresnel’s developed
theory (the sentiment goes), they would have realized the superiority of the wave
theory once they were given the key empirical input of destructive interference.
And now that we have this empirical result, the opening move for any defender
of the wave theory ought to be an appeal to one of the experiments above, even
though none of them logically compel agreement with the wave theory. Moreover,
this is compatible with a multiplicity of crucial experiments. Arago was right in
1838 to say that an experiment like Foucault’s would be crucial, even though he
had pronounced Young’s experiment crucial six years earlier. Finally, like most
honors, the title of “crucial experiment” is granted at least as much to increase
the prestige of the granting institution as to reward the recipient. The wave
theory is superior because it can cleanly account for the above experiments, and
these experiments are important because they demonstrate important physical
principles of the wave theory of light.
The AB effect is crucial on the topological view in much the same way that
Young’s double-slit experiment is crucial on the wave theory of light. The central
principle of the topological view is that the electromagnetic field is represented
better by a principal connection than a field strength tensor at the classical
level, and one difference between these representations is clearly evinced in
the AB effect. A necessary condition for this difference to arise is that the
region under consideration be topologically nontrivial, like the region outside a
magnet. Experimental setups with imperfect shielding are still instances of the
AB effect, because they exhibit the difference between the principal connection
interpretation and the field strength interpretation. Later work by Wu and Yang
(1975) was necessary to consolidate the topological interpretation of the AB
effect and to draw further conclusions based on it, much like Fresnel’s work was
needed for the wave theory of light. But in light of this work, the empirical
input of the nontrivial phase in an AB experiment is the grounds on which the
topological view advises adopting the principal connection interpretation.
If we adopt the topological view then we can appeal to the AB effect for
justification elsewhere. For example, consider the problem of quantizing gauge
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theories like electromagnetism. In his attempts to quantize general relativity
Feynman used the simpler case of gauge theories as a testing ground. In both
cases Feynman found he needed the ad hoc introduction of an “artificial, dopey
particle” (1963, 710) to obtain physically sensible answers when calculating
one-loop contributions to the dynamics. Subsequent work by Faddeev and Popov
(1967)—later refined by Becchi et al. (1976) and Tyutin (1975)—showed that
Feynman’s computations could be extended to the general case if we demand
that the quantization procedure treat gauge-equivalent configurations in the
same way. The topological view offers a justification for this demand: we know
already from the AB effect that gauge equivalence is the correct substitution
relation for gauge potentials, so our quantization procedures should respect
this.15
From this perspective, Earman’s complaints about the “bastardized” setting
of the AB effect lose their sting. The AB effect concerns the behavior of an
electron in an electromagnetic field, where the electron is modelled as a quantum
particle and the electromagnetic field as a classical field. Earman remarks that
this setting is “infelicitous”, and that a “more appropriate context would be
relativistic quantum field theory” (2019, 2016). Presumably the thought is that
the AB effect is an issue in the foundations of physics, and therefore we should
set our discussion in our most fundamental description of the system at issue.
But on the topological view, the AB effect is part of the justification for our more
fundamental theory of the electromagnetic interaction, because it constrains
the classical limit of theory. And even if we forget about justification, QED
presupposes that the principal connection interpretation is right and the field
strength tensor interpretation wrong. QED lacks the ambiguity that Aharonov
and Bohm set out to resolve, so we can’t devise an experimental context in which
the AB effect would be informative.
This conception of the AB effect as a crucial experiment also helps identify
why the topological view and Shech and Earman so often talk past each other.
On the topological view, the AB effect demonstrates the principle that equipotent
but gauge-inequivalent potentials represent distinct states of the electromagnetic
field. The only relevant features of such a demonstration are those required
for gauge equivalence and equipotence to come apart—namely, topological non-
triviality. Shech and Earman’s diagnoses of the topological view’s problems
presume a kind of holism on which we can only speak of one spacetime region,
while the topological view assumes that the relevant theories are separable. Talk
of infinite potentials and boundary conditions focuses on precisely the inessential
features of the effect. No matter what we say about self-adjoint implementations
of the Hamiltonian, and even if we say nothing at all, we will still be able to
justify the usual approach to QED by appeal to the principle established by the
AB effect. In short, the topological view gives a context such that the AB effect
can serve as a premise. Shech and Earman’s treatment makes the AB effect the
15The chiral anomaly is in many ways a better illustration of the topological view’s use
of the AB effect, since it concerns QED more directly and makes more detailed used of the
principal connection structure that’s so important to the topological view (Bertlmann, 1996,
Ch. 8). However, the technical overhead for this example is beyond the scope of this paper.
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answer to a question, instead. And it’s hard to see why it’s a question of any
interest.
5 Conclusion
I have sought to defend the topological view of the AB effect against Shech and
Earman’s criticisms and to argue that the AB effect doesn’t involve idealization
in any particularly interesting way. It is not relevantly analogous to the debate
over the thermodynamic limit in statistical mechanics, because it involves no
limits. You might model some features of an AB experiment using infinite limits.
For example, you might model the screen or the shielding of the electromagnetic
source as an infinite barrier. But these aren’t part of the AB effect. This is clear
from the fact that the exact same issues arise when modelling the screen in an
ordinary double-slit experiment for an uncharged particle. Infinite barriers in
quantum mechanics may involve interesting questions of idealization, but the
AB effect doesn’t involve infinite barriers. If there’s any sense in which the AB
effect involves an idealization, it’s an idealization at the framework level. If the
AB effect is to do its job in guiding the construction of a quantum theory of the
electromagnetic interaction then it must appear in a regime that’s well-modelled
by a theory we understand, like non-relativistic quantum mechanics. If we adopt
a more fundamental theory, like QED, then the semiclassical setting of the AB
effect is an idealization of a kind. But if we adopt QED then we’ve answered
the question to be posed of the AB effect.
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